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Abstract 
 
We begin with a general discussion of the ways in which the concept of taste has 
been treated, moving on to what is sometimes taken as a (if not the) controversy 
in the field. That controversy centres on the apparent differences between socio-
political accounts (Bourdieu) and psychological-emotional accounts (Campbell) 
of taste. What we then show is that the distinction is just that: apparent, on the 
surface only. What it conceals is a more deep-seated agreement between the two 
schools about what it is to be a human subject. Here we take our cue from 
Foucault and Foucault scholarship (Hunter; Rose; Coveney) and make the 
argument that what appear to be ‘theories’ of taste are, from a pragmatic point of 
view, in fact rhetorical exercises of the self akin to cookbooks, advertisements 
and TV cookery shows. This paper, then, problematizes the emergent field of 
taste studies and presages an approach beyond those predicated on an essentially 
Kantian version of human being. That approach takes its cue from 
ethnomethodological insights about techniques of ordinary practical actions and 
from Hannah Arendt’s idea of the disclosure of the self as fundamental to social 
being. 
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 ‘It’s not about good taste. It’s about tastes good’: 
Bourdieu and Campbell’s Soup ... and Beyond 
 
 
What is taste? In any discussion of the consumption of food as a cultural object, 
‘taste’ seems to have a duality of meaning. It firstly refers to bio-sensory 
manifestations of oral and olfactory sensation in the discernment of sweet, sour, 
bitter, and salt nuances. Secondly, it refers to a socially-linked concept where to 
have ‘good taste’ is a sign of distinction, and vice versa. This ambiguity perfectly 
captures (since it derives from) the Kantian dilemma concerning matters of 
judgment in general: how can individual, sensual, bodily, tasting-events be 
anchored in publicly-available rules of taste-as-discernment? 
 
‘Taste,’ then, according to one side of the story, tends to gloss the preferences and 
choices of an individual and is therefore essentially private. Yet the public is 
never far away, for everyone may, according to the same story, be assumed to 
choose what tastes and feels good — including willed preferences for the bad. 
Accordingly, the ideal of good taste (as discernment or distinction) is meant to 
move beyond the individual, and to be socially binding. It betokens a potentially 
universal standard — that is, a standard applicable to all members of a given 
society by contrast, as we shall see, with its ‘others.’ This raises the spectre of an 
ideal which every member would ideally follow. Furthermore, this ideal 
standard would, again ideally, be socially communicable even if it could never be 
determined precisely and conceptually, as it were, ‘in the abstract’ (Gronow 1997: 
91). 
 
Gronow's identification of the duality of taste mirrors that of Kant. Kant makes 
the distinction between the taste that is merely subjective and that which is  
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universally subjective. Taste is simultaneously subjective, in that it relates to 
individual perceptions and universally subjective, in that to rise to the status of 
the ‘beautiful’ it needs to be communicated and validated with others. Hence: 
The first of these I may call the taste of sense, the second, the taste of 
reflection: the first laying down judgements merely private, the second, 
on the other hand, judgements ostensibly of general validity (public), 
but both alike being aesthetic (not practical) judgements about an object 
merely in respect of the bearing of its representation on the feeling of 
pleasure or displeasure (Kant 1952: 54). 
Kant elaborates on this by suggesting that taste as a sense — that is ‘taste of the 
tongue, the palate and the throat’ and what may ‘be agreeable to the eye and 
ear’ — is based on private feeling and is restricted in scope to the individual 
(1952: 51). In universal subjectivity, or what is generally considered as ‘good 
taste’, taste is an idea that we communicate and, in so doing, ‘we believe 
ourselves to be speaking with a universal voice, and lay claim to the 
concurrence of every one’ (1952: 56). Kant continues: 
The judgement of taste itself does not postulate the agreement of every 
one (for it is only competent for a logically universal judgement to do 
this, in that it is able to bring forward reasons); it only imputes this 
agreement to every one, as an instance of the rule in respect of which it 
looks for confirmation, not from concepts, but from the concurrence of 
others (1952: 56). 
 
Brillat-Savarin (at least on Barthes’ reading) replays Kant’s hierarchy of taste as 
the ‘tiering of taste.’ Barthes comments on this tiering when he notes that 
Brillat-Savarin ‘decomposes the gustatory sensation in time’ as: 
1  direct (when the flavour is still acting on the front of the tongue); 
2  complete (when the taste moves to the back of the mouth);  
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3  reflective (at the final moment of judgement). 
All the luxury of taste is found in this scale; submitting the gustatory 
sensation to time actually allows it to develop somewhat in the manner 
of a narrative, or of a language (Barthes 1985: 61). 
Accordingly — that is, because the concept of taste can be so elusive as to offer no 
concrete empirical research options — there has been intensive speculation over 
the mechanics of food choice and the taste-acceptability of food from a vast raft 
of disciplinary perspectives, including the biological, the anthropological, the 
psychological and the sociological (Rozin 1982; Douglas and Gross 1981; Falconer 
et al. 1993; Glanz et al. 1990; Mennell 1996; Mennell et al. 1992; McIntosh 1996; 
Gronow 1997). For all this endeavor, the answer to the food choice question 
necessarily remains a riddle — there is (and can be) no one correct response and 
no one correct combination of responses that can best fit either the private or the 
public version of ‘taste,’ let alone the pair as a whole. Despite this, the issue is 
routinely simplified, as Santich (1996: 18) concludes when posing the question ‘so 
why do we eat what we eat?’ and answering: ‘Because that’s the way we were 
born, the way we are — and because we like those flavours.’ The question, then, 
remains effectively unresolved vis-à-vis what it is that actually determines 
preferences for some flavors over others. And, as we shall see, there is a very 
good (almost built-in) reason for this deep unsatisfiability. 
 
Taking another angle and going a little further than Santich’s somewhat 
tautological and commonsensical solution to the problem, Falk (1994: 79) asks: 
‘how can other’s food become our food?’; how do we learn to adopt food that we 
have not been exposed to historically or culturally — ‘because that’s the way we 
were born’? This question lies at the root of the success of what is sometimes 
called ‘ethnic’ food, as if there were a food that were not. In this vein, considering 
distinctions between ‘our’ food and ‘theirs,’ Bourdieu and Campbell have both  
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tried to problematize the taste, fashion and pleasure nexus with more subtle 
responses, with both effectively anchoring the question of taste in a group of 
related (and more fundamental) concepts. For Bourdieu, these anchoring 
concepts are ultimately social; for Campbell they are deeply psychological — the 
two (let alone the combination of the two as the ‘poles’ of taste studies) thereby 
preserving the Kantian public-private duality, as we shall see.i 
 
Bourdieu’s thesis centres on his concept of habitus: 
The habitus is both the generative principle of objectively classifiable 
judgements and the system of classification … of these practices. It is in the 
relationship between the two capacities which define the habitus, the 
capacity to produce classifiable practices and works, and the capacity to 
differentiate and appreciate these practices and products (taste), that the 
represented social world, i.e., the space of life-styles, is constituted 
(Bourdieu 1984: 170). 
Here, according to Featherstone (1987: 123): ‘tastes and lifestyle preferences, 
which in our society are frequently individualized, are therefore a product of a 
specific habitus which in turn can be related to the volume of economic and 
cultural capital possessed....’ Hence ‘the position a particular occupation, age or 
gender category, class or class fraction occupies can be mapped onto the social 
space.’ So, for Bourdieu and those who follow him, taste is ultimately predicated 
on social class and the affirmation of class boundaries. Food choice is therefore, 
according to Coveney’s (1996: 50) critical summary, about ‘positioning people in 
accordance with their class expectations and their collective consciousness, it is 
therefore what distinguishes one group from another.’ Bourdieu himself goes on 
to argue that the manifestation of taste and its use to delineate social groups is 
more about ‘distaste.’ That is, ‘in matters of taste, more than anywhere else, all 
determination is negation; and tastes are perhaps first and foremost distastes,  
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disgust provoked by horror or visceral intolerance (“sick-making”) of the tastes 
of others’ (Bourdieu 1984: 56). Bourdieu’s move is interesting here: confining his 
answer to the question of taste to the realm of the public-social, he can no longer 
prioritize the Kantian counter-category of the private-individual. Supplementing 
this binary (and so also preserving it), then, another crops up confined to the 
space of sociality: the distinction between ‘our’ taste and our distaste for the 
tastes of the ‘other.’ General social categorization and demarcation, then, 
precedes and determines any actual, empirical event of what might be called 
‘tasting.’ii 
 
If Bourdieu argues that tastes, culture and pleasure are both class experiences 
and historically constructed, other theorists — associated with Colin Campbell’s 
position — take the opposite view: that individuals must ‘discover pleasure for 
themselves, their aesthetic responses being a matter of individual psycho-history 
rather than class or group membership’ (Gabriel and Lang 1995: 113; our 
emphasis).iii For Campbell, modern consumption is effectively reducible to 
modern hedonism and is characterized by a longing for pleasures generated 
through the psychological activity of day-dreaming. According to Gabriel and 
Lang’s (1995: 104) critical summary of this position, hedonism has moved on 
from the traditional ‘hedonism of sensations attached to the senses’ to seeking 
‘pleasure not in sensation but in emotion accompanying all kinds of experiences.’ 
Campbell’s (1987: 77) argument is therefore that: 
pleasure is sought via emotional and not merely sensory stimulation, 
whilst, secondly, the images which fulfil this function are either 
imaginatively created or modified by the individual for self-consumption, 
there being little reliance upon the presence of ‘real’ stimuli. 
Campbell (1987: 89) goes on to say that the essential activity of consumption is 
not about the machinations of selection, purchase and use. Instead, it involves  
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‘the imaginative pleasure-seeking to which the product image lends itself, “real” 
consumption being largely a resultant of this “mentalistic” hedonism.’ At this 
point it is perhaps wise to rehearse Gabriel and Lang’s caution over Campbell’s 
very singular view of the consumer as pleasure-seeker. Consumption, for them, 
is about selection and purchase of commodities, so that both the domestic 
consumer and the tourist are more complex than simply one-dimensional 
hedonists. Gabriel and Lang (1995: 109) put this succinctly: ‘it would be bizarre to 
envisage a single mother shopping for her weekly groceries as being lost in a 
reverie of pleasure.’ 
 
What emerges, then, from both Bourdieu and Campbell’s accounts is a neophilic 
consumer (and/or tourist) who is on an endless quest for novelty. The quest is 
either, for Bourdieu, to reinforce class divides and find novelty as social 
distinction or, for Campbell, to supply experiences not yet encountered, thus 
making it possible to ‘project onto [a] product some of that idealized pleasure 
which [one] has already experienced in day-dreams and which [one] cannot 
associate with those familiar products currently being consumed’ (Campbell 
1987: 89). Campbell goes on to argue that the consumer seeks out the novel rather 
than the familiar because this ‘enables him to believe that its acquisition and use 
can supply experiences which he has not so far encountered in reality’ (1987: 89). 
Yet the consumer needs to situate the novel within a framework of the 
psychologically familiar in order to maximize the pleasures that it can deliver — 
to be able to day-dream about something requires pre-given knowledges and 
expectations. 
 
For Bourdieu, apparently by contrast, pleasure emerges as the central theme for 
the new middle classes, where it has metamorphosed from an old morality of 
duty simpliciter to a new morality of pleasure as a duty.  
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Thus whereas the old morality of duty, based on the opposition between 
pleasure and good, induces a generalized suspicion of the ‘charming and 
attractive,’ a fear of pleasure and a relation to the body made up of 
‘reserve,’ ‘modesty’ and ‘restraint,’ and associates every satisfaction of the 
forbidden impulses with guilt, the new ethical avant-garde urges a 
morality of pleasure as a duty. This doctrine makes it a failure, a threat to 
self-esteem not to ‘have fun.’ ... Pleasure is not only permitted but 
demanded, on ethical as much as on scientific grounds (Bourdieu 1984: 
367).iv 
Featherstone furthers this role of the new middle classes whereby the emergence 
of pleasure as a duty transforms those classes into ‘cultural intermediaries’ with 
‘an interest in searching for new cultural goods, re-discovering old fashion, de-
stabilising existing symbolic hierarchies to make the social space more fluid’ 
(Featherstone 1987: 131). This role of cultural intermediary is best exemplified by 
Appadurai (1988) when he discusses the role of the middle class as taste-makers 
in the making and remaking of a national cuisine through the medium of 
cookbooks. 
 
But, at the end of the day, are the ‘grand theories’ of a Bourdieu or a Campbell, 
any different — in their pragmatic and technical effect — from recipe books? 
Could they be among the recipe books of the modern self? Or, to switch 
metaphors, even if Bourdieu’s and Campbell’s soups result in quite distinct 
tastes, could it still be that they are made from the same basic stock? 
 
On the surface, Bourdieu’s position appears as the very antithesis of the 
Campbell school of thought on taste: social distinctions (rather than emotional 
and psychological states) appear to underpin questions of taste. Yet, and this is 
important, the two positions (roughly associable with Campbell and Bourdieu  
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respectively) make the same epistemological shift. Both positions de-emphasize 
actual, material and sensory cases of tasting and ground them in transcendental 
categories. It hardly matters, at this level, whether those transcendental 
categories are psycho-emotional (Campbell) or socio-political (Bourdieu). Both, 
for all their surface differences, preserve a Kantian version of a human subject 
caught between, on the one hand, empirical-sensory events in a material world 
(as Kant would say, of the flesh) and, on the other, transcendental conditions 
which are the ultimate roots of such events but which are, in themselves, utterly 
deracinated ideals.v Let us further explore this fundamental assumption at the 
heart of the two seemingly very distinct accounts of taste. 
 
We can summarize this by means of a simple matrix: 
 
  Transcendental   Empirical  Goal 
  conditions  events 
 
Bourdieu:  Social distinction    ⇑  Tasting as ‘sense’  Novelty 
    (as social difference) 
Campbell:  Psychological drive ⇑  Tasting as ‘sense’  Novelty 
    (as new pleasures) 
 
What is critically present in both schools, then, is an initial and abiding 
separation of the human subject into its empirical (sensory) and transcendental 
(general conditional) components. This is the model of ‘man’ that Foucault, in 
The Order of Things (1972) refers to as the ‘empirico-transcendental doublet’ 
characteristic of modernity and particularly instantiated in Kantian thinking. This 
subject is not historically universal; rather it could always have been otherwise. It 
is not how we fundamentally are, but how we have been, as it were, persuaded 
to become via the manifold techniques of the self increasingly available as 
modernity has aged. Instead, then, of thinking of the two ‘philosophies’ of taste  
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as pure theories of an ontically given object (‘objective’ taste), we could come to 
view them as being much more like techniques of the self in their own right: 
rhetorical moves that help re-persuade us, re-confirm us in our dual identities as 
subjects of modernity. That is, they could be viewed as effectively identical 
(rather than polar-opposite) asceses or practical ethics.vi 
 
Bourdieu, to be sure, as we have just now seen, mentions the domain of the 
ethical (by and large as an effect of social class). But what he does not see is how 
his own (along with Campbell’s) fundamental view of what it is to be human is 
an actual instance of a rhetorical technique for producing a particular kind of 
‘ethical subject.’ These are not ‘theories’ of taste, then, but contributions to 
technologies of practical subject formation. Here they find themselves ranked 
with other such technologies of taste as cookery programs on TV, recipe books, 
advertisements and home economics lessons. 
 
This re-location of what appear as theories (but act as ethical exercises) points us 
in a new direction for the analysis of taste — a direction we can barely begin to 
sketch in this forum. On this view, pleasure becomes part of self-formation as an 
‘ethical subject.’ Taste and fashion, or as Coveney (1996: 106) describes them 
‘manners and customs,’ are a part of those pragmatic and historical (or ‘evental’) 
techniques that are designed to generate pleasures of quite specific kinds: 
Within contemporary Western society conduct around food is 
problematic, and the pleasures of eating require careful consideration 
within today’s mores, where overt enjoyment of a gustatory nature is 
invariably modified by manners and customs which are to operate not 
only in public but also in private. 
Here the public-private distinction, so important to the thinking-style of 
modernity, is considerably loosened. At the level of technique, either ‘zone’ can  
Taste/page 10 
be effected and acted on identically. Or rather, the distinction between public 
‘good taste’ and individual (sensory) tasting is re-valued as a distinction between 
ethical ‘sites’ corresponding to the two hemispheres of the Kantian self. We find 
the same rhetorical tropes in, for example, food advertisements where consumers 
are not only told a particular food is fashionable (publicly distributed) but also 
extremely good for an individual to eat and beneficial to their bodily health. In 
both ‘high theory’ and popular culture, then, we find the same techniques 
applied to the self by which ‘individuals come to construe, decipher, act upon 
themselves in relation to the true and false’ (Rose 1992: 144; cf. Foucault 1984, 
1985, 1988, 1989). What appears as ‘true’ is any discourse which recognisably and 
accountably reproduces Western ‘man’ as the empirico-transcendental doublet. 
Contrastively, what appears as ‘false’ is any discourse which even begins to 
question this version of the subject as what we fundamentally are and always 
have been — unproblematically. 
 
Taste, then, finally, is an ensemble of (largely rhetorical) techniques for re-
affirming a very particular and limited story about ourselves — albeit one that 
has (because it produces the conditions for) an effective aura of truth. None of the 
presently available discourses on taste, then, can tell us what it is: for they must 
all count as ‘true’ on our reading. While the present paper has so far 
problematized this issue, we still await a fully-fledged account that runs radically 
counter to the currently dominant and very restrictive ‘true story’ of human 
being and how it tastes. 
 
Can we begin to imagine another account of taste that mobilizes a different and 
distinct ethics — where, by ‘ethics’, we refer to any general account of human 
being, to our ethos? That is, can there be a way of thinking of taste that is at least 
somewhat beyond what we have so far encountered in Campbell and Bourdieu: a  
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fundamentally Kantian version of ‘man’ as the ‘empirico-transcendental doublet’ 
(Foucault 1972: 303-343)? 
 
We could start with an utterly sceptical alternative as a working hypothesis. This 
would run: ‘taste’ is always an abstract concept; it has much the same status as 
‘memory’, ‘love’ and ‘goodness’; to that extent it is properly a matter for 
metaphysical speculation only; it has no place in the social sciences. Now this 
would be attractive were it not for its re-singularisation of taste — perhaps as a 
radical response to both Bourdieu and Campbell’s dualisms — and were it not 
for the fact that it would make studies of taste, as concrete consumer practices, 
impossible. It also neglects the fact that taste can be (though it need not be) a 
purely physiological matter. So let us see if we can progress the initial hypothesis 
into something slightly more workable for practical social-scientific investigation. 
 
The problems with the ‘ineffability of taste’ thesis suggest a further tripartite 
distinction — which we forward again, to some extent, for the purposes of 
argument and also knowing that we are still echoing Kant: 
 
1. Taste as physiological fact; E.g., ‘This food tastes bitter’ (Fact). 
2. Taste as subjective judgment; E.g., ‘This food tastes good’ (Value A). 
3. Taste as public judgment; E.g., ‘He has good taste in food’ (Value B). 
 
Clearly, the social sciences will have little interest in the first two of these. They 
are the provinces of food science and aesthetics respectively. The third domain, 
we suggest, is the main locus at which questions of consumption arise and, 
accordingly, where social scientific interest should be concentrated. But how do 
we separate the second from the third sense of taste? Both are matters of 
judgment; both concern the ‘good.’  
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Wittgenstein in his ‘Lecture on Ethics’ (1965) gives us an initial clue. He makes a 
division within his well-known logical-ethical, or fact-value, distinction. Within 
the ethical partition, that is, he distinguishes the relative (ordinary judgment) 
from the absolute (ethical judgment). Relative propositions include such things as 
‘This is a good football player.’ Absolute propositions, on the other hand, refer to 
applications of universal values: ‘This man’s life was valuable’ (1965: 6). So when 
Wittgenstein delimits the properly ethical, he is referring to the latter kind of 
statement, the absolute. Propositions of the first (relative) kind are just ordinary 
propositions — good football is an empirical matter by and large. But 
propositions of the second (absolute) kind are instances of what he means by 
‘ethics’ as such. They are questions about, for example, what constitutes the value 
of a life — ‘the absolute good, the absolute valuable’ (1965: 12). And, for 
Wittgenstein, such questions become hopeless as they move us ‘beyond 
significant language’ (1965: 11). Ethics proper, as the Tractatus has it, is 
transcendental — it is that whereof we cannot speak (1972: paras. 6.421 & 7). 
Now we have to ask: how do taste domains 2. and 3. (above) map on to this 
distinction between relative and absolute? 
 
It seems clear that type-2 judgments are relative while type-3s are absolute, at 
least in Wittgenstein’s sense. What I personally find to be a good taste (in food or 
clothing, or in any other consumable) is somewhat equal to my judgment that, 
say, Ryan Giggs is a good footballer. Others may disagree, citing, for example, 
his merely workmanlike dependability next to an acknowledgedly brilliant 
improvizer like David Beckham. But once good taste as such is on the agenda, 
there is an appeal to a certain absolute set of criteria. One either has it, or one 
does not. Wittgenstein, however, gives up at this point. We have, he thinks,  
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reached a limit which, if transgressed, will, once again, take us ‘beyond 
significant language.’ 
 
But is this not, itself, a kind of impractical scepticism? Does it not ignore the 
whole sphere of pragmatics? The ‘whereof we cannot speak’ of absolute ethics is, 
especially for the early Wittgenstein, in pragmatic terms only a restriction on a 
certain kind of speaking, a certain kind of discourse. And that kind of discourse 
is logico-scientific discourse. Wittgenstein’s point is that we can’t adduce the 
propositional certainties of natural science in the domain of ethics. So, to put it 
bluntly, we should realise our limits and shut up once and for all! 
 
Yet logico-scientific discourse is not the only language game at our disposal. 
(And this is what the Wittgenstein of the Investigations (1968) realised to have 
been his fatal mistake in the earlier Tractatus (1972).) If we look at the ordinary 
and quite messy world we inhabit on a day-to-day basis, we find people making 
all sorts of what the Wittgenstein of the ‘Lecture’ would call absolute judgments: 
judgments of taste for example. And they do this not as scientific or pseudo-
scientific propositions, but in quite different and distinct discourses (or language 
games). The form of life of science (and its logical reasoning) is not the same as 
the everyday (and its locally-specific, effective reasoning). 
 
What the early Wittgenstein had forgotten, if we may be so bold, is an important 
distinction made by Alfred Schütz (1962: 34-47) between first and second order 
constructs. The natural scientist deals with constructs of the first order: when she 
arrives on the scene of her investigation, the objects before her are completely 
open to interpretation. Atoms, galaxies and capybaras have not pre-interpreted 
themselves. By contrast, human beings are, as the semiotic theorists put it (see 
Bains (2002)), aware of their capacity to manipulate the sign-relation. They have  
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engaged in manifold and elaborate interpretations of themselves prior to the 
arrival of the social scientist who is therefore confined to constructs of the second 
order: interpretations of pre-existing interpretations. 
 
The upshot, for us, of this is that absolute judgments of taste (type-3 versions of 
taste) are in fact (and routinely) made: but as pragmatic components of the 
ongoing business of everyday life as self-interpretation. So it may well be the 
business of taste studies to at least begin to describe such things. This would 
mean a quite different program of studies from those proposed by Bourdieu, 
Campbell and their ilk.  
 
One way of getting at this domain would be to say that type-3 judgments are 
routinely narrativized. In the absence of categorical statements about ‘good taste’ 
(or, for that matter, ‘bad taste’), human beings are nevertheless able to draw 
upon multiplicitous stories of their own or others’ judgments in order to show (if 
not strictly to say, propositionally) what they think taste is. For example, in a TV 
advertisement for Australian beef, some castaways at sea imagine in graphic 
terms what they would cook once rescued and returned to their homes. The 
advertisement runs roughly as follows: 
Castaway 1: Well Charles, you’re catering officer, what’s for dinner 
tonight? 
Castaway 2: Ah. Well. Tonight we have something really special. Steak 
Parmigiana. 
Castaways 1 & 3: Aaah. 
Castaway 2: I take a beautifully lean oyster blade steak, seared and sealed 
on both sides. Then I sauce it lightly in a mixture of onions, basil 
and white wine. And then, next to it I nestle a scoop of tender 
macaroni tossed with herbs and alongside that crunchy snow peas.  
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And then, finally, I top off the steak with black olives and melted 
slices of mozzarella cheese. 
Castaway 1: Oooh Charles, you’ve really excelled yourself this time. 
Castaway 3: Best ever! 
(Their raft bumps into a large ship and a ladder is let down.) 
Castaway 1: Isn’t that always the way, right in the middle of dinner. 
 
Taste is clearly shown through this kind of trope, if not said in so many words. 
(You read or watch the ad. and you taste at least something that may or may not 
have been actually tasted.) What is happening here is that a taste is made tellable. 
To be tellable, something extraordinary has to be envisaged and depicted. 
Ordinary life as usual is not tellable. Actual practical acts of ‘tasting’ (type-2) 
have to be fabricated into absolutes (type-3): ‘Best ever!’. As Harvey Sacks 
reminds us, there is an embargo on the statement of the utterly obvious — we are 
not obliged, for example, always to answer ‘truthfully’ to the greeting ‘How are 
you?’  — because it’s a greeting not a request for information (Sacks 1975). To put 
matters of taste (in the type-3 sense) on the agenda is to create an ordinary 
account of the recognisably — tastably — unobvious, the remark-able, the tell-
able.vii As we said, taste is like memory, love and goodness. To tell you I have a 
memory of taking a knife from my kitchen drawer this morning to butter my 
toast is not a legitimate piece of telling. It utterly lacks tellability, for all its truth. 
To tell you that I took it out of the drawer to stab a burglar is tellable. Ditto for 
taste. It requires the quotidian accounting of something routinely outside the 
quotidian itself. And it is on these grounds that all forms of consumer culture — 
from logos and brands to advertising campaigns — depend. The advertisement 
below puts the matter succinctly — it effectively self-analyses:viii 
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This is an example of how we make our own interpretations of our ‘taste’ and 
our ‘tastes’. This is not ‘Taste’ in any utterly absolute sense. To that extent the 
early Wittgenstein is right. But for social scientific purposes — for serious 
investigations of consumer culture — it is what data we have. And each instance 
can be inspected for a new key to taste and consumption: the locally account-able 
and practical fabrication of the absolute. In the ad., ‘good taste’ (as an absolute) is 
fabricated as an imaginary foil to something thereby more obviously 
recognizable: what ‘tastes good’. 
 
To that end, here’s a third — though much more famous — fragment of taste 
‘data’: 
And then suddenly the memory came to me: it was the taste of a morsel of 
madeleine that my Aunt Léonie used to dip in her tea or in her infusion of 
lime and give me to sip when I went to her bedroom to say good morning 
on Sundays.... Before I tasted the little cake that my mother had given me,  
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the sight of it had not reminded me of anything; I had often seen them 
since the Combray days, displayed in cake-shops, but had never eaten 
any, which may be why their appearance had become divorced from those 
days and associated with more recent times... (Proust 1982: 34). 
This is, of course, Proust recounting how a single moment of tasting a cake is 
capable of recreating a whole period of ‘lost time.’ Here, taste is intimately tied — 
in a way that sight, for example is not — to another quite specific ethical 
technique. The presence of the madeleine is nothing remarkable for the older 
Marcel — he has seen many such things before. But now, with the moment of 
taste, something remarkable (tellable!) does happen: great temporal distances are 
able to be spanned. Marcel as he was, in his boyhood, becomes completely 
available to the older man in intimate sensory detail: ‘the smell and the taste of 
things, prevailing like disembodied spirits, remembering, waiting, hoping and 
holding up on their frail but unfaltering foundation the immense edifice of 
Memory’ (1982: 34-35). 
 
Taste, in this case, is a technique for answering an ethical puzzle: how can I still 
be that totally different person I was then? What is the continuity between 
moments of the self that leave it, after sufficient time, prone to complete change 
and difference? Taste acts on ethical temporality and difference to fabricate a 
sense of the self as an historical being. It is in such ways that a public social sense 
of the self can be fabricated in the first place. The self — pace Bourdieu and 
Campbell — is not easily given by attention to simple formulae such as the 
reunion of ‘empirical’ and ‘transcendental’ values. Rather it is constantly being 
made and re-made through, for example, piecemeal ethical techniques of tasting 
and its remark-ability. 
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This kind of remark-ability or tellability, then, may be a critical aspect of taste — 
albeit, as we have seen, one that is neglected in the standard literature on taste. It 
seems to suggest an ensemble of piecemeal techniques for doing such things as 
solving ethical puzzles about our very social being whose surface we have only 
just begun to scratch in this account. 
 
Let us speculate then: that telling our tastes — being unique in having our tastes 
as tellables — is not a mere ‘nicety’ or an option for ‘chit chat.’ Rather, it may be 
part of the very core of our existence as social things: as self-interpreting beings 
who (alone of all the things we know) have the capacity for self-disclosure. 
Hannah Arendt puts this as follows — and here she could easily be writing of the 
disclosure of tastes, though her own her concerns are more wide-ranging: 
... when I insert myself into the world, it is a world where others are 
already present. Action and speech are so closely related because the 
primordial and specifically human act must also answer the question 
asked of every newcomer: ‘Who are you?’ The disclosure of ‘who 
somebody is’ is implicit in the fact that speechless action somehow does 
not exist, or if it exists is irrelevant; without speech [cf. telling], action [cf. 
tasting] loses the actor, and the doer of deeds is possible only to the extent 
that he is the speaker of words, who identifies himself as the actor and 
announces what he is doing... (2000: 179).ix 
We are not then, as the adage has it, what we consume. Rather we are what it is 
possible to dis-close (open up, un-conceal, tell) of our consuming selves.x And 
this suggests an analysis of taste as the explication of the routine grounds of its 
telling. Roland Barthes, though in a sense he may not himself have completely 
recognised, may have been right when he told us earlier that ‘submitting the 
gustatory sensation to time’ — that is, to time as concrete lived-and-told 
experience — ‘actually allows it to develop somewhat in the manner of a  
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narrative, or of a language.’ The analytic of taste needs to discover some of the 
basic grammar of that ordinary natural language (pragmatically, from actual 
cases of its telling and remarking) before it should even dare ponder any grand 
theory of ‘Taste’ and its necessary reliance on what we have shown to be a very 
limited idea of human being. 
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Notes 
 
i.  Even the subtitle of Bourdieu’s seminal work on taste, A Social Critique of 
the Judgement of Taste, deliberately plays on that of Kant’s third critique. 
ii.  Lupton (1996: 35) elaborates on this when she argues that the ‘revulsion 
for the food eaten by another is a common expression of discrimination 
and xenophobia, a means of distinguishing between social groups.’ 
iii.  Lury (1996: 72) refines this when she argues that Campbell’s concept of 
consumption is self-directed, that there are independent desires to pursue 
but that this pursuit involves shared cultural values and ideals and does 
change over time. 
iv.  We will return to this question of ethics below, but in a way that is quite 
distinct from Bourdieu’s own. 
v.  This summary owes much to Ian Hunter (personal communication). 
vi.  This argument derives from Hunter’s (1993) work on Marxism and 
Romanticism as being less ‘pure theories’ of the human condition and 
more technical practices for effecting a particular and limited version of it. 
vii.  See Sacks’s discussion of An Ordinary Camp by Micheline Maurel — an 
even more extreme case than that of our castaways (1992: 780). 
viii.  It helps to know here that a competing Australian wine producer uses the 
slogan ‘Always in good taste’. 
ix.  This deep connection between action and talk is remarkably close to that 
of Harvey Sacks in one of his earliest papers ‘Sociological Description’ 
(1963) where he imagines culture as a machine with two parts: the doing 
and the talking part. Of course, by the end of the paper, the separation is 
utterly spurious: it cannot be made with any analytic precision. If we want 
to know, as sociologists do, how people act in the world, we need not 
describe their actions from a distance, as if they were atoms or electrons; 
rather we need to find ways of describing how they, themselves, tell of 
(interpret or analyse) their actions — in and as speech-actions in their own 
right. There need to be further investigations into the connections between 
Sacks’s and Arendt’s (different but related) dis-solutions of the 
speech/act(ion) distinction and their ramifications for a radically 
alternative sociology of culture. 
x.  A further possibility for research is the role played by the crucial 
Arendtian faculties of ‘promising’ and ‘forgiving’ in telling others about  
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our tastes. Because the upshots of our actions are unknowable in advance, 
and because our actions are irrevocable once carried out, we have to be 
able to ‘promise’ (go forward together) and ‘forgive’ (redeem each others’ 
mis-deeds): ‘forgiving and making promises are like control mechanisms 
built into the very faculty to start new and unending processes’ (2000: 
181).  
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